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Abstract
While exports within NAFTA face a lower hazard, its onset has increased the
hazard of exporting between the members, though intra-NAFTA exports still enjoy a
lower hazard. There are diﬀerences in the timing of the eﬀect of NAFTA across the
three members. Unlike the eﬀect on Canadian exports, the eﬀect on Mexican and U.S.
exports is persistent. Exports of IRS manufacturing products faced the highest hazard
across all three members. The eﬀect of NAFTA on the hazard of exporting each of the
three returns to scale type of products is exporter speciﬁc with no uniform patterns.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to investigate the eﬀect of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the hazard of exporting of the three member countries and
(2) to investigate how production technology, diﬀerent returns to scale, aﬀect aﬀect the
hazard of exporting. I focus on the three members of NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the
U.S., to take advantage of the virtually barrier free trade between them and evaluate the
eﬀect of NAFTA on trade between the members and their trade with non–members. I use
annual exports at the 6-digit Harmonized Schedule level between 1990 and 2007.
NAFTA was an expansion of the Canadian U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) to
include Mexico in the free trade area. One of the arguments in favor of CUSFTA was the well
known source of welfare gains in models incorporating increasing returns to scale or economies
of scale – namely that tariﬀ–free access to the U.S. market will allow the Canadian ﬁrms
to expand production, take advantage of economies of scale, and become more productive
resulting in welfare gains for both producers and consumers. Treﬂer’s (2004) inﬂuential
work has shown that the eﬀect of CUSFTA was precisely as predicted by economy of scale
models. CUSFTA initiated a contraction of low productivity plants resulting in a 12 percent
decrease in employment, but also ushered a period of rising labor productivity increasing
it by 15 percent. This paper contributes to the understanding of the diﬀerence between
diﬀerent types of returns to scale.
The eﬀect of CUSFTA/NAFTA on productivity is but one of many aspects of the agree-
ments to have been investigated. Canadian industries that experienced the largest tariﬀ cuts
enjoyed the largest productivity gains. Romalis (2007) shows that the two free trade agree-
ments have had a substantial eﬀect on the volume of international trade, but a much smaller
eﬀect on prices and welfare. Much work has been devoted to identifying whether CUSFTA
and NAFTA were primarily trade creating or trade diverting. Clausing (2001) found that
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CUSFTA was primarily trade creating having increased U.S. imports from Canada without
reducing imports from other trading partners. Treﬂer (2004) found evidence of both trade
diversion and trade creation, with creation the dominating force. Romalis (2007) raises the
possibility of a substantial trade diversion eﬀect of NAFTA/CUSFTA which may be respon-
sible for increased North American output and prices in once highly protected sectors.
Other researchers have focused on the eﬀects of NAFTA/CUSFTA on the extensive
margin. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) found that especially in cases of thin trade relationships,
trade liberalization is a key ingredient in sparking the growth of the extensive margin, an
important source of new trade. Canada and Mexico are one example of a country-level
relationship which did no involve much trade prior to Mexico joining NAFTA. Debaere and
Mostashari (2010) ﬁnd a small eﬀect of trade liberalization on the extensive margin of U.S.
imports for the 1989–1999 and 1996–2006 periods.
After providing some descriptive information on the evolution of exports of NAFTA
members, I examine the hazard of exporting. I ﬁnd that while exports between the three
NAFTA members face a much lower hazard rate than their exports to non-members, the
onset of NAFTA itself has increased the hazard of Mexican and U.S. exports to fellow NAFTA
members and had no net eﬀect on the hazard of Canadian exports to other NAFTA members.
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. exports of increasing–returns–to–scale manufacturing products
face a higher hazard than do constant–returns–to–scale products. The onset of NAFTA has
increased the hazard of exporting increasing–returns–to–scale products for Mexico and the
U.S., but has had no eﬀect on Canadian exports of those products. Mexican exports of
increasing–returns–to–scale natural resource products face a lower hazard than constant–
returns–to–scale products, U.S. exports of the same products face a higher hazard, while
there are no diﬀerences between the two in Canadian exports. NAFTA has signiﬁcantly
increased the hazard of U.S. exports of increasing–returns–to–scale natural resource products
and has had a marginal increasing eﬀect on Canadian exports of the same products. Only
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U.S. exports of constant–returns–to–scale have experienced a change due to NAFTA with
the hazard increasing.
The role of returns to scale and free trade agreements in duration of exports has not
been examined to date. Thus, this paper makes a contribution to the duration of trade
literature in addition to making a contribution to the literature on the eﬀects of NAFTA.
Duration of trade was ﬁrst examined by Besedesˇ and Prusa (2006a, 2006b) who noted that
most U.S. import relationships are short lived and that diﬀerentiated products are exported
to the U.S. in longer lasting relationships than homogeneous goods. Nitsch (2009) has found
similar results for German imports. Besedesˇ and Prusa (2010a) provide a comprehensive
summary of the duration of trade literature.
2 Motivating Model
To motivate the estimation of the hazard of exporting consider the following simple extension
of the Melitz (2003) model. Suppose that ﬁrms are subject to exogenous, serially correlated
productivity or product appeal shocks, µ. Firms that draw a favorable parameter µ are
more likely to export. Firms which have drawn positively correlated µ’s are likely to remain
exporters for a long period, while those with negatively correlated µ’s are more likely to cease
exporting sooner. Firms that draw a particularly large µ will tend to export more both in
terms of volume and duration, particularly if their µ’s are positively correlated. Even in the
case of a negative correlation, ﬁrms with initially large µ’s may export for a longer period,
depending on the rate of decrease and initial value of µ. Firms which have just started
exporting are more likely to exit than those that have exported for a long time because their
µ’s are closer to the level at which they are indiﬀerent between exporting and not exporting.
Exporters who have been active for a long time are more likely to have drawn a sequence of
positive µ’s and are likely to have wandered farther from the margin of indiﬀerence between
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exporting and not exporting. Thus one should expect to observe a lower hazard the longer
the relationship. This basic model explains why one might observe ﬁrms of varying duration
of exporting.
NAFTA (or any free trade agreement) aﬀects ﬁrms through its eﬀect on µ. Free access to
a foreign market can either be attributed to a positive productivity shock or product appeal
as it reduces costs of supplying a market. NAFTA may have had a diﬀerential eﬀect based
on the nature of returns to scale used in the production of a product. Classic economies
of scale models argue that access to a large foreign market increases ﬁrm productivity as
Treﬂer (2004) has found for NAFTA. This would entail an increase in the parameter µ, thus
making it more likely ﬁrms would both start exporting and export longer, even if their µ is
negatively correlated over time. In addition, one would expect this eﬀect to be the strongest
for smaller countries, Canada and Mexico in this particular investigation, given their new
access to a signiﬁcantly larger U.S. market. For U.S. ﬁrms the domestic market is suﬃciently
large to exploit most economies of scale making it less likely that additional economies of
scale can be exploited by accessing another market. Given Treﬂer’s (2004) results on the
eﬀect of NAFTA on productivity of Canadian ﬁrms, one would expect to ﬁnd that IRS
manufacturing products face a lower hazard when destined to NAFTA members.
3 Data
I used data on Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. export ﬂows recorded at the 6-digit Harmonized
Schedule (HS) level. Data for Canada and Mexico come from the UN Comtrade database,
while data for the U.S. were aggregated from 10-digit HS data available from the U.S. Census
U.S. Exports CDs/DVDs. I use annual data between 1990 and 2007 for all three countries.
In each year I identify new export relationships and track these relationships until they
cease to be active. A relationship is deﬁned as the instance of a country exporting a 6-digit
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HS product to another country, such as Mexican exports of “Monumental/building stone,
cut/sawn” (HS 680221) to Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy,
Japan, and the U.S. among others. Since the purpose of this paper is to investigate the
hazard of exporting I convert annual data to spells of service. A spell reﬂects the number of
consecutive years while a relationship is active.
To identify the production technology and the nature of returns to scale for each product,
I use the classiﬁcation developed by Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002). They identify four types
of returns to scale: increasing–returns–to–scale (IRS) manufacturing, increasing–returns–
to–scale natural resources, constant–returns–to–scale (CRS), and non–robust increasing–
returns–to–scale industries for which they could not establish the exact nature of the returns
to scale. The latter group of industries are omitted from the analysis. The share of export
volume and export relationships of products with identiﬁed returns to scale varies across
the three countries. Canada has some 22% of its export volume and a half of its export
relationships in products with robustly identiﬁed returns to scale. Mexico has 40% of export
volume and 44% of export relationships in such products, while the U.S. has 65% of export
volume and 59% of export relationships in such products.
Canada Mexico U.S.
Annual observations All 559,942 311,881 2,250,343
New 416,970 253,713 1,165,839
Fraction new 0.75 0.81 0.52
Relationships All 140,215 71,082 356,969
New 116,046 61,990 240,942
Fraction new 0.83 0.87 0.68
Spells All 231,055 124,300 621,910
New 206,886 115,208 505,883
Fraction new 0.90 0.93 0.81
Table 1: Data Summary
Table 1 presents summary information for products with robustly identiﬁed returns to
scale for each country. Since I focus on exports created after 1990 the table presents infor-
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Figure 1: New and Old Exports and Relationships
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mation for all exports as well as new exports. The U.S. has signiﬁcantly more annual ob-
servations, export relationships, and spells of service than Canada and Mexico put together.
Perhaps the largest diﬀerence across the three countries is in the fraction of observations
in exports created since 1990. While Canada and Mexico have 75% and 81% of all annual
observations created after 1990, the U.S. has almost a half of all of its observations started
prior to 1990. These diﬀerences decrease as one looks at export relationships, 83% and 87%
for Canada and Mexico and 68% for the U.S., and spells of service, 90% and 93% for Canada
and Mexico versus 81% for the U.S.
Figure 1 oﬀers a diﬀerent perspective on the diﬀerence between exports started prior to
1990, old exports, and those started afterwards, new exports. Top row panels show the total
volume of both old and new exports, while bottom row panels show the total number of
both old and new export relationships. A note on the use of the term ’new’ – it refers to
all export volume or relationships created after 1990. For example, in 2005 new exports and
relationships would be all those created since 1990 and not only those created in 2005 alone.
In every panel old and new values are normalized by the total 1990 values. Thus, values for
new exports are fractions of the 1990 value of old exports.
For every country, new exports embody a signiﬁcantly lower volume, with the diﬀerence
the largest for Mexico. While old exports embody more value, they also grow at a much
slower rate than new exports. For Canada the 1991–2007 growth rate of the volume of old
exports is 141% while it is 1,512% for new exports. For Mexico the corresponding ﬁgures
are 727% and 2,172%, while for the U.S. they are only 13% for old exports and 1,372% for
new exports. By 2007 some 15% of all Canadian, 12% of all Mexican, and 16% of all U.S.
exports are embodied in relationships started since 1990.
While the top row of Figure 1 shows that new exports are signiﬁcantly smaller in volume
than old exports, the opposite is true for the number of export relationships which carry
that volume. The number of old relationships declines over time for every country since their
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ranks cannot increase by deﬁnition. The rate of decline from 1991 to 2007 is similar across
the three countries: 66% for Canada and 57% for both Mexico and the U.S. Canada and
Mexico are similar in that they have slightly more than a half of all relationships in 1991 in
old exports, while the U.S. has almost 80% of its relationships in old exports. Canada’s new
relationships grow the most at 513%, followed by Mexico’s at 469%, with the U.S. having
the slowest rate of growth at 186%. While new exports account for a relatively small share of
total exports in 2007, new relationships account for a signiﬁcant number of all relationships
in 2007: 91% for Canada, 92% for Mexico, and 68% for the U.S. A ﬁnal note on the growth
in the number of relationships. The rate at which new relationships are created exceeds the
rate at which new relationships end in almost every year for every country as the number of
relationships started after 1990 grows in almost every year.1 These facts are supportive of the
broad conclusion of Besedesˇ and Prusa (2010), that, for at least some countries, the extensive
margin is relatively unimportant in the sense that over time it does not account for much of
the volume of exports, even though it accounts for a signiﬁcant share of relationships. There
is a lot of churning at the extensive margin in terms of the number of relationships, but
much less in terms of the volume of exports which remain a relatively small share of total
exports.
Figure 2 identiﬁes an interesting pattern in the share of export volume and export rela-
tionships destined to NAFTA members. Top panels present NAFTA shares of export volume
and relationships embodied in old exports, while bottom panels shows NAFTA shares of new
exports. In every country much of the eﬀect of NAFTA is by far stronger in relationships
already active in 1990. By 2000 almost 90% of Canada’s old exports were destined for Mex-
ico and the U.S.. The share of NAFTA destined relationships for Canada has quadrupled
from 10% to 40%. Mexico has enjoyed an even stronger dominance of NAFTA destined old
1The exceptions are 1996 for Canada; 1996, 1997, 2000, and 2001 for Mexico; and 1997, 1998, 2002, and
2007 for the U.S.
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Figure 2: New and Old Exports and Relationships to NAFTA Members
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exports, with the share of the volume of old exports increasing to more than 95% and the
share of relationships increasing to 60%. The U.S. has the most diversiﬁed structure of
exports with the share of the volume of exports destined to NAFTA members doubling from
20% to 40% and relationships increasing by some two percentage points to 8%. Top panels
indicate that NAFTA seems to have had a very strong positive eﬀect on the growth of both
export volumes and relationships in exports created prior to 1990.
Patterns for new exports created after 1990 are more varied. While the share of the
volume of Canadian exports destined to NAFTA members has increased by a factor of eight
to 24%, the share of relationships displays an inverted U shape, increasing from 2.5% to
almost 4.5% before returning to the original share of 2.5%. For Mexico the share of the
volume has increased from 5% in 1991 to just under 20% by 2007, but having increased to as
much as 40% in the intervening years. The share of relationships was slightly lower in 2007
at roughly 6% than in 1991, but has increased to as much as 9% in the intervening years.
The decrease in both Canadian and Mexican exports to NAFTA members in the latter part
of this period may have been caused by the displacement of trade due to the rising presence
of Chinese exports in the U.S. market, as investigated by Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters
(2010). The U.S. has had the smallest shares of exports destined to NAFTA members, a
consequence of a more diversiﬁed export structure.
In Figure 3 I examine the evolution of shares of export volume and relationships across the
three types of products based on returns to scale used in production. While the majority of
Canadian exports involve IRS manufacturing products, they have experienced a fair amount
of change since 1990. The creation of CUSFTA resulted in a rapid drop in the share of IRS
manufacturing products from 80% of exports to 50% by 1994. The addition of Mexico to
CUSFTA resulted in an increase in the share of IRS manufacturing products to 60% by but
it has trended back towards 50% by 2007. The share of exports in CRS products more than
doubled from 20% to 45% by 1994, but has trended downward ever since. The 1996, share
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Figure 3: IRS Export and Relationship Shares
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of IRS natural resource products has increased rapidly from less than 5% of exports to almost
20% by 2007.
Mexico has had a diﬀerent experience. While the share of IRS manufacturing products
in exports has decreased to 55% immediately after NAFTA took eﬀect, it has since increased
to about 65%. The share of CRS products has decreased from slightly more than 40% to
about 30% after enjoying and initial boost from NAFTA. The share of IRS natural resource
products has increased consistently, though to a much lesser degree than for Canada. The
U.S. has a more balanced distribution of exports across the three types of products. Unlike
Canada and Mexico the U.S. has the largest share of its exports in CRS products. Following
CUSFTA the share of CRS products decreased from 44% to 35% by 1995, followed by a
sharp increase to 60% by 1999. It has decreased steadily since to about 47% in 2007. The
share of IRS manufacturing products has ﬂuctuated from some 40% in 1991 and 1995 and
has decreased to some 25% in 2007. IRS natural resource products decreased from more
than 30% in 1994 to less than 15% in 2001 before increasing to roughly 30% by 2007.
NAFTA members are more similar in the distribution of relationships. In every country
IRS manufacturing products account for the largest share of and have followed rather similar
paths. For all three the share of IRS natural resources has been relatively stable over time,
being the largest for the U.S. at some 5%. As a result shares of IRS manufacturing and
CRS products largely look as mirror images of each other. IRS manufacturing has increased
slightly in Canada, and somewhat more for Mexico and the U.S., though the total increase
in the share from 1991 to 2007 is only several percentage points.
There are larger ﬂuctuations in shares of exports destined to NAFTA members, as seen
in Figure 4. CRS products dominate the share of exports for each country. For Canada, it
has increased from some 40% in 1991 to almost 80% in 1995 before collapsing to some 20%
by 2007. In Mexico the share of CRS products has ﬂuctuated between some 40% in both
1991 and 2007 and more than 60% reached on several occasions. In the U.S. the share of
12
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Figure 4: IRS Export and Relationship Shares in Exports to NAFTA Members
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CRS products has steadily increased from less than 40% to more than 75% by 2007. Canada’s
exports of IRS manufacturing goods rapidly decreased with the formation of CUSFTA from
almost 60% in 1991 to less than 20% in 1995 before rebounding under NAFTA to more than
30% in the early 2000s and settling at some 25% in 2007. The share of IRS manufacturing
products in Mexico’s exports to NAFTA members has decreased from 60% to around 40%,
while their share in U.S. exports to NAFTA members has decreased from some 60% to
around 20%. IRS natural resource products share in Canadian exports increased rapidly
between 1991 and 1992, decreased as rapidly by 1995, and ﬁnally increased to more than
50%, dominating Canadian exports by 2007. In Mexico’s exports the share of IRS natural
resource products increased modestly until 2005 when they enjoyed a rapid increase to almost
20%. Their share in U.S. exports has remained largely constant and small.
Fluctuations have been much smaller in the distribution of relationships. The share of
IRS natural resource product relationships has remained steady below 10% for both Canada
and Mexico, and at roughly 10% for the U.S. The share of CRS product relationships in
Canadian exports to NAFTA has increased from 50% to more than 60% in the late 1990s
before returning to some 50%. The share of IRS manufacturing products has mirrored that
of CRS products, ﬁrst decreasing from 60% before returning to that level by 2007. The share
of CRS product relationships in Mexican exports to NAFTA members has ﬂuctuated around
50% and that of IRS manufacturing has ﬂuctuated around 45%. The U.S. oﬀers a diﬀerent
picture with CRS products relationships accounting for a roughly constant 75% share of
relationships and IRS manufacturing products accounting for a roughly constant 18%.
4 Hazard of Exporting
The investigation of the hazard of exporting has a dual purpose: to examine both the eﬀect of
NAFTA and returns to scale on the hazard of exporting. I estimate the hazard of exporting
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using the most ﬂexible speciﬁcation by means of estimating a probit model. Unlike the Cox
proportional model, it is appropriate for discrete duration data as annual spell data are and
does not impose the restrictive proportional hazard assumption.2 I include a dummy for each
year in the spell while the spell is active allowing the hazard to change in every year while
the spell is active. This ﬂexibility comes at the cost of a more complicated interpretation of
estimated coeﬃcients. Since the hazard can change in every year so will every explanatory
variable have a diﬀerent eﬀect in every year. Interpreting the estimated probit coeﬃcients
either by looking at coeﬃcients or the associated marginal eﬀects does not reveal the true
eﬀect of each covariate. Instead, I will examine the estimated hazard at means of all variables
but the variable of interest to ascertain the full eﬀect of the variable of interest.
I use the following variables to estimate the hazard of exporting. The gross domestic
product of the destination country is expected to reduce the hazard, while distance to the
destination country is expected to increase the hazard. I use two measures of common
language; one capturing whether two countries share an oﬃcial language and the other
whether more than 9% of the population speak the same language. In as much as common
language reduces costs, both are expected to reduce the hazard. I use two measures to capture
information spillovers; one measures the number of products exported to the same country,
while the other measures the number of countries to which the same product is exported.
The former measures experience with a country, while the latter measures experience with
a product. Both are expected to reduce the hazard of exporting. A lower economic risk of
the importer is expected to reduce the hazard. As previous papers in the duration of trade
literature have found, the volume of initial exports should reduce the hazard of exporting.
The coeﬃcient of variation of unit values measures the extent of the variation of unit values
for each product across all export destinations. It reﬂects the extent of product diﬀerentiation
2The proportional hazard assumption implies that the eﬀect of a variable on two diﬀerent exporters is
independent of the length of a spell and is always proportional.
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as reﬂects by unit value diﬀerences. I use a dummy to capture any colonial relationship in
the past. Finally, I use dummies to capture each multiple instance of a spell which exists
since there are more spells than relationships (see Table 1).
Two dummies are used to capture the eﬀect of returns to scale, one for IRS manufacturing
products and one for IRS natural resource products with CRS products as the baseline. Since
spells of export relationships created after 1990 stretch across the period prior to and after the
establishment of NAFTA, it is possible to distinguish between two NAFTA related eﬀects.
Therefore, I use two dummies. One simply captures exports to NAFTA members, while the
other one captures whether NAFTA itself is in eﬀect. Estimates of these four dummies are
of main interest. Results are reported in Table 2.
Most variables have identical qualitative eﬀects across all three exporters. Similar to
other papers in the literature, the larger the GDP of importer the lower the hazard for both
Canadian and U.S. exports. The eﬀect of importer’s GDP on the hazard of Mexican exports
is positive whereby larger GDP raises the hazard, an unexpected result. To the extent that
Mexican exports to larger and more developed economies are potentially of lower quality
may result in them experiencing a higher hazard than exports to smaller economies. The
economic risk variable oﬀers a somewhat puzzling result. With higher values indicating a
riskier economy, a negative coeﬃcient implies that U.S. exports to riskier economies face
a lower hazard, rather than a higher one as one might expect. This result highlights the
presence of uncertainty in international trade as modeled by Rauch and Watson (2003)
and empirically investigated by Besedesˇ (2008). It is possible exports to highly uncertain
economies are undertaken only once the exporter is relatively certain these exports will be
long lived so that they may generate a proﬁt for the exporter. Such a strategy minimizes
costs associated with exporting especially in a situation when odds are that exports will not
pay oﬀ. Economic risk has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on Canadian exports, while Mexican exports
face a lower hazard when destined for less risky markets, as expected.
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Canada Mexico U.S.
GDP (ln) -0.014*** 0.036*** -0.037***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Economic risk (ln) -0.040 0.082*** -0.058***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.010)
Initial exports (ln) -0.046*** -0.069*** -0.092***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Partners by product (ln) -0.430*** -0.453*** -0.577***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Products by partners (ln) -0.264*** -0.302*** -0.358***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Cov unit values (ln) 0.026*** -0.009*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Distance (ln) 0.045*** -0.062*** 0.078***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005)
Common language (oﬃcial) -0.027* 0.048* -0.050***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.005)
Common language (minority) 0.006 -0.063** -0.021***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.005)
Colonial relationship -0.021 -0.011 -0.014
(0.017) (0.023) (0.009)
IRS manufacturing 0.104*** 0.064*** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
IRS natural resources -0.003 -0.119*** 0.066***
(0.020) (0.046) (0.009)
NAFTA members -0.262*** -0.702*** -0.864***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.068)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.032 0.160*** 0.183***
(0.055) (0.040) (0.070)
Constant 3.472*** 2.849*** 6.339***
(0.117) (0.122) (0.059)
Observations 187,188 168,642 667,787
Spells 103,851 81,732 292,694
Relationships 70,288 46,272 146,289
Log-Likelihood -101,030 -91,418 -377,429
Year in spell FE Y Y Y
Spell number FE Y Y Y
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **,
*** denoting signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Table 2: Hazard Estimates
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The volume of exports at the start of a relationship has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect for
all three countries, consistent with results in the literature, resulting in longer lived spells for
relationships starting with a larger volume. Information spillovers have large negative eﬀects
– the more products exported to a country or the more countries a product is exported to,
the lower the hazard and the longer the duration. Both of these results are consistent with
Cadot et al. (2010) and Besedesˇ (2011). The more variable are the unit values for Canadian
and U.S. exports the higher the hazard. The eﬀect for Mexican exports is opposite, with
more variable unit values resulting in a lower hazard and longer duration of exports.
To the extent that distance reﬂects transportation costs, the further away the export
markets are the higher the hazard of Canadian and U.S. exports, as expected. For Mexico
the eﬀect is the opposite – hazard is lower for exports destined for markets further away
from Mexico. Oﬃcial common language has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect for Canadian and
U.S. exports resulting in a reduced hazard if exported to a country with English as an oﬃcial
language. Mexican exports to countries with Spanish as the oﬃcial language face a higher
hazard. The minority common language has a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect for
Mexico and the U.S., indicating longer duration and lower hazard, while it has no eﬀect on
Canadian exports. Exports to countries with a colonial history are no diﬀerent form exports
to countries without a colonial history for all three exporters.
In terms of the four dummies of main interest, exports of increasing–returns–to–scale
manufacturing products face a higher hazard than constant–returns–to–scale products for
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. exports. U.S. exports of increasing–returns–to–scale natural
resource products face a higher hazard, while Mexican exports of increasing–returns–to–scale
natural resource products face a signiﬁcantly lower hazard. Canadian exports of such prod-
ucts are indistinguishable from constant–returns–to–scale products. Exports to a NAFTA
member face a signiﬁcantly lower hazard for all three countries, with the eﬀect strongest for
the U.S. and weakest for Canada. Surprisingly, the establishment of NAFTA increased the
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Figure 5: Estimated Hazard and the Eﬀect of NAFTA
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hazard of Mexican and U.S. exports, while it has no eﬀect on Canadian exports. The
establishment of NAFTA may have induced too many ﬁrms to try to take advantage of new
opportunities created by NAFTA, thus resulting in more failures. Essentially, NAFTA may
have induced some ﬁrms who otherwise would not export to do so only to quickly realize
they cannot compete in the foreign market.
Figure 5 illustrates the magnitude of the diﬀerence in the hazard between exports destined
to NAFTA members and non-NAFTA members as well as the magnitude of the eﬀect of
NAFTA. The hazard of exporting to NAFTA members is lower than to non-NAFTA countries
for all three members, with the diﬀerence the largest for Mexico and the U.S. The pure eﬀect
of joining NAFTA is almost nonexistent for Canada. The enactment of NAFTA has a much
larger eﬀect for Mexico and the U.S., increasing the hazard of exporting to NAFTA members,
but not suﬃciently to completely oﬀset the lower hazard of exporting to a NAFTA member.
The onset of NAFTA has thus increased the hazard of exporting to member countries, with
the exception of Canadian exports.
To better understand the nature of the eﬀect of the implementation of NAFTA on the
hazard of exporting, Table 3 shows the results with the NAFTA–in–eﬀect variable having
a time–dependent eﬀect, for three year intervals starting in 1994. Since the coeﬃcients for
other variables are virtually unchanged, I only present the coeﬃcients for the time–dependent
NAFTA–in–eﬀect variable.3 These four dummies indicate in which years did the existence
of NAFTA aﬀect the hazard of exporting. While the onset of NAFTA has no net eﬀect on
Canadian exports, the time–dependent coeﬃcients indicate that the onset of NAFTA did
increase the hazard of Canadian exports to the other two NAFTA members immediately
after the onset of NAFTA and had no eﬀect after 1997. The opposite holds for Mexico:
there is no eﬀect in the ﬁrst three years of Mexican participation in NAFTA, while in every
subsequent three–year period exports to other NAFTA members face a signiﬁcantly higher
3Full results are available on request.
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Canada Mexico U.S.
NAFTA in eﬀect 1994–1996 0.194*** 0.024 0.163**
(0.074) (0.048) (0.083)
NAFTA in eﬀect 1997–1999 -0.059 0.202*** 0.077
(0.068) (0.045) (0.082)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2000–2002 -0.061 0.273*** 0.337***
(0.064) (0.047) (0.078)
NAFTA in eﬀect 2003–2005 0.050 0.145*** 0.137*
(0.058) (0.046) (0.079)
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **,
*** denoting signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%; year in spell and spell number
ﬁxed eﬀects included.
Table 3: Time–Dependent NAFTA Eﬀect
hazard. U.S. exports to NAFTA members face a higher hazard consistently since the onset
of NAFTA, with the exception of the three–year period between 1997 and 1999.
4.1 NAFTA and Returns to Scale
I have argued above that one might expect the hazard of exporting increasing–returns–to–
scale manufacturing products to have the lowest hazard when destined to NAFTA markets
given advantages oﬀered by access to larger markets. The above results that IRS manufac-
turing products face the highest hazard are potentially indicative of the opposite holding.
However, the appropriate examination of such a hypothesis entails comparing the hazard of
exporting to NAFTA members, to which I now turn. Rather than introducing a number of
interacted variable to examine whether the eﬀect of NAFTA is diﬀerent for diﬀerent returns–
to–scale products, I estimate the hazard of exporting for each of the three returns–to–scale
types of products, focusing on the NAFTA–in–eﬀect coeﬃcients, and compare the ﬁtted
hazards for each country. In order to conserve space I only present coeﬃcients relevant to
NAFTA.4 Table 4 collects the results.
Exports of all three countries in all three returns–to–scale types face a lower hazard.
4Full results are available on request.
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Canada
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.249*** -0.264*** -0.167***
(0.064) (0.083) (0.055)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.068 0.157* 0.031
(0.067) (0.085) (0.059)
Mexico
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.589*** -0.499*** -0.611***
(0.057) (0.078) (0.056)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.187*** 0.087 0.061
(0.043) (0.060) (0.040)
United States
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.984*** -0.917*** -0.860***
(0.117) (0.125) (0.066)
NAFTA in eﬀect 0.398*** 0.416*** 0.213***
(0.123) (0.126) (0.068)
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **, *** denoting signiﬁ-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%; year in spell and spell number ﬁxed eﬀects included.
Table 4: Eﬀect of NAFTA across Returns to Scale
In the case of Canada, the onset of NAFTA has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the hazard of ex-
porting increasing–returns–to–scale manufacturing and constant–returns–to–scale products,
and only marginally increases the hazard of exporting increasing–returns–to–scale natural
resource products. In the case of Mexico, the net eﬀect of NAFTA which was to increase
the hazard of exporting to NAFTA members (see Table 2) seems to be driven by its ef-
fect on increasing–returns–to–scale products facing a higher hazard. The other two types of
products do not seem to be aﬀected by the onset of NAFTA. In the case of the U.S., the
onset of NAFTA increases the hazard of exporting all three types of products based on the
returns–to–scale used in production.
Figure 6 shows the estimated eﬀects of diﬀerences between the diﬀerent types of returns
to scale and their interaction with the implementation of NAFTA for exports to NAFTA
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Figure 6: Estimated Hazard and the Eﬀect of NAFTA and Returns to Scale Diﬀerences
23
members. The top panels examine diﬀerences between constant–returns–to–scale and increasing–
returns–to–scale manufacturing goods, while the bottom panels focus on constant–returns–
to–scale and increasing–returns–to–scale natural resource products. Canadian exports of
IRS manufacturing products face a lower hazard than exports of CRS products. The hazard
of exporting both types of products increases with the onset of NAFTA, though the increase
is small, preserving diﬀerences between them. Canadian exports of IRS natural resource
products face a lower hazard in the absence of NAFTA than do exports of CRS products.
The onset of NAFTA makes the two much closer.
There are almost no diﬀerences between the hazard of IRS manufacturing and CRS prod-
ucts for Mexican exports to NAFTA members in the absence of NAFTA. NAFTA increases
both hazards, with the hazard of IRS manufacturing products increasing more. A similar
conclusion can be drawn for IRS natural resource products when compared to CRS products,
though diﬀerences brought on by NAFTA are smaller. Diﬀerences in the hazard of export-
ing to NAFTA members of the three types of products are largest for the U.S. While IRS
manufacturing products face a lower hazard than CRS products in the absence of NAFTA,
the enactment of NAFTA increases the hazard of both largely eliminating any diﬀerence
between the two. IRS natural resource exports of the U.S. face a lower hazard than exports
of CRS products. While NAFTA increases both hazards, it increases the hazard of exporting
IRS natural resource products by a much larger margin resulting in them having the higher
hazard. Thus, only for Canada is there evidence of the expected eﬀect of NAFTA, of IRS
manufacturing products having the lowest hazard after the enactment of NAFTA.
Table 5 contains the time–dependent eﬀects of NAFTA for each returns to scale type,
shedding more light on the exact nature of the eﬀect of NAFTA on the hazard of exporting.
For Canada, NAFTA has increased the hazard of exporting IRS manufacturing and CRS
products only during its ﬁrst three years, while the hazard of exporting IRS natural resource
products was higher in the ﬁrst three years as well as between 2003 and 2005. For Mexico,
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Canada
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.249*** -0.263*** -0.166***
(0.064) (0.082) (0.055)
NAFTA 1994–1996 0.270*** 0.362*** 0.184**
(0.089) (0.117) (0.081)
NAFTA 1997–1999 -0.003 0.102 0.020
(0.086) (0.108) (0.074)
NAFTA 2000–2002 -0.095 -0.065 -0.100
(0.077) (0.099) (0.067)
NAFTA 2003–2005 0.106 0.224** 0.050
(0.069) (0.089) (0.061)
Mexico
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.589*** -0.499*** -0.612***
(0.057) (0.078) (0.055)
NAFTA 1994–1996 0.098* -0.049 -0.127***
(0.051) (0.071) (0.048)
NAFTA 1997–1999 0.214*** 0.092 0.084*
(0.049) (0.071) (0.046)
NAFTA 2000–2002 0.326*** 0.282*** 0.223***
(0.051) (0.070) (0.047)
NAFTA 2003–2005 0.111** 0.005 0.048
(0.049) (0.069) (0.048)
United States
IRS Manufacturing IRS Natural Resources CRS
NAFTA members -0.984*** -0.917*** -0.860***
(0.117) (0.125) (0.066)
NAFTA 1994–1996 0.484*** 0.429*** 0.122
(0.145) (0.154) (0.081)
NAFTA 1997–1999 0.216 0.446*** 0.129
(0.138) (0.145) (0.080)
NAFTA 2000–2002 0.609*** 0.559*** 0.393***
(0.136) (0.134) (0.075)
NAFTA 2003–2005 0.251* 0.210 0.175**
(0.146) (0.151) (0.077)
Robust standard errors clustered by relationships in parentheses with *, **, *** denoting signiﬁ-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%; year in spell and spell number ﬁxed eﬀects included.
Table 5: Time–Dependent Eﬀect of NAFTA across Returns to Scale
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NAFTA has increased the hazard of exporting IRS manufacturing products consistently ever
since it was enacted. It has increased the hazard of exporting IRS natural resource products
only between 2000 and 2002, while its eﬀect on CRS products is most varied. It has initially
reduced it, and then increased it between 1997 and 2002, with no eﬀect since 2003. NAFTA’s
eﬀect on the hazard of U.S. exports to NAFTA members is the most consistent one, having
increased the hazard for every type of product in almost every year. Higher hazard of CRS
products started in 2000, while the higher hazard of IRS natural resource products was in
eﬀect until 2003.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I investigated how the North American Free Trade Agreement has aﬀected the
members’ hazard of exporting and how diﬀerences in returns to scale in production manifest
themselves in exports of three members: Canada, Mexico, and the United States. NAFTA
itself has not had a beneﬁcial eﬀect eﬀect on the hazard of exporting. Rather, the eﬀect has
been negative for the U.S. and Mexico, with the hazard of their exports to NAFTA members
increasing with the enactment of NAFTA. However, the said increase was not large enough
to fully oﬀset the lowers hazard exports to NAFTA members enjoy due to the geography of
the FTA and proximity of the members to each other. Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. enjoy
a signiﬁcantly lower hazard on exports to each other without the presence of NAFTA. Given
the particular geography of NAFTA, the eﬀect of common borders between the members, a
well known positive force in international trade, is largely indistinguishable from the eﬀect of
NAFTA. The nature of the geography of NAFTA makes it diﬃcult to broadly conclude that
every free trade agreement increases the hazard of exports between the members, calling
for an investigation of the eﬀect of free trade agreements with less restrictive geographic
characteristics.
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In terms of diﬀerences across the nature or returns to scale, increasing returns to scale in
manufacturing increases the hazard relative to constant returns to scale. Exports to NAFTA
members in these products are aﬀected diﬀerently in the three members countries. Canadian
exports of IRS manufacturing products have a lower hazard than CRS products after the
enactment of NAFTA. While there are no diﬀerneces between the two types of products
exported by Mexico in the absence of NAFTA, NAFTA itself has increased the hazard of
IRS manufacturing products more than that of CRS products. In the U.S. NAFTA has
completely eroded the advantage in terms of a lower hazard that IRS manufacturing goods
enjoyed prior to its onset.
Canadian exports of IRS natural resource products to NAFTA members have been ad-
versely aﬀected by the onset of NAFTA relative to CRS products facing the same hazard as
CRS products after NAFTA’s onset. Mexican exports of IRS natural resource products to
NAFTA members have experiences an increase in the hazard due to NAFTA which is higher
than that of CRS products. U.S. exports of IRS natural resource products used to enjoy a
lower hazard than CRS products prior to NAFTA. NAFTA has increased the hazard of both
and reversed their ordering with IRS natural resource products facing a higher hazard.
I presented the ﬁrst evidence of the eﬀect of a free trade agreement on the hazard of
exporting. While NAFTA increases the hazard of exporting, further investigation is needed
with free trade agreements among countries which are not as geographically clustered as the
NAFTA members are. Mercosur and the European Union are two free trade areas which
oﬀer a diﬀerent geography which could shed additional results on the role of a free trade
agreement. In addition, I presented the ﬁrst evidence on the eﬀect of the returns to scale
on the hazard of exporting. Unlike diﬀerences along the product diﬀerentiation dimension,
which are largely consistent across a number of countries, the identiﬁed eﬀects of returns to
scale are exporter speciﬁc. Since these results are based on three exporters only, additional
investigation of other countries is warranted.
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